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Review of the Debates in Parliament on the Treaty of Peace.

(Continued from page 647, and concluded.)

I shall not pursue the impolicy of this omission of renewing former treaties through its other melancholy effects on our gum trade on the Senegal and our claims in the Bay of Honduras; because the arguments urged by ministers, *if they do* prove the *existence* of our rights, yet do not exculpate the treaty, any more than in the case of India, from the charge of not *securing* the *peaceful enjoyment* of them; and because the French have already *shown*, beyond a doubt, in the instance of the gum trade, *their* manner of understanding this omission.

But, Sir, the enemies of the present peace object to it, that it not only affords no protection to many of our own rights, but that it abandons our allies, the Queen of Portugal and the Prince of Orange; that in the instance of the latter, the article which professes to secure him an indemnity is so loosely worded, as in fact to leave him at the mercy of his enemies, and that the treaty between the French and Dutch, by which the latter are exonerated from affording this indemnity, is a fraud on him and on us.

To this charge, Sir, I blush to say I can find no answer.

In the case of Portugal, for whom we pretend to have done much in securing the boundary of the Arowary, it is alleged by Mr. Windham, that this boundary gives the French the command of the navigation of the River Amazons as much as did the frontier of the Carapanatuba. For the truth of this he refers to the map, where we find that the Arowary falls into the mouth of the Amazons, and consequently, when in the hands of *a stronger power* commands the navigation of that river. Ministers deny this consequence; and General Maitland urges the eagerness with which this point was contested between France and Portugal as a presumption to the contrary. The proof of it must, however, rest with the event. But the *doubt* of it is a sufficient objection to this part of the treaty. And even *granting* the facts contended for by ministers, yet Sir, you and I, and all of us must observe, that still the *integrity* of Portugal is not preserved; that by the loss of Olivenza to Spain and of part of Guiana, she comes out of this contest in which she embarked with us in a *worse* condition than she was when she entered into it. Thus Portugal suffers by our alliance; the Prince of Orange is expelled in consequence of it, and if he be ever indemnified, he will owe it rather to the unusual generosity of France than to the power or honour of Great-Britain.

Thus to abandon your allies is always a flagrant breach of policy as well as of faith; and this too with the aggravated mockery of stipulating for them is insult added to injury—and in the instance of Great-Britain, circumstanced as this country is, it is madness, it is political suicide. For with that vast power, which by the present peace we have confirmed to France, consolidated as her empire will be by the sanction of glory and by an interval of tranquillity—how can we contend unless at the head of an alliance? How can we a few years hence even whisper those words which Marlborough thundered in the plains of Flanders "the balance of power," unless our feeble notes are echoed by allies? And who will risk the loss of their colonies like Portugal, or the sacrifice of their political existence like the Stadtholder, upon the honour of Great-Britain? Will not other nations profit by the example of these powers, and prefer to submit to the mercy of the Consul?

With the balance of power national independence is ultimately sacrificed. This is proved in every page of history, from the fall of Greece under Philip—I will not add to that of Europe under Buonaparté. I will only observe, Sir, that there is too much analogy between our conduct to the Stadtholder and that of the Athenians to the state of Olynthus.

Thus much for our regard to our allies, let us next look to what we restore to France and *her allies*.

While we were sacrificing the possessions

of the Portuguese crown in Guiana, it appears that ministers were ignorant of the secret treaty by which Louisiana was ceded by Spain to France; at least when urged by Mr. Thomas Grenville they did not deny it. But it does not appear, that on the discovery of this secret negotiation, any equivalent was given to Britain or her allies. Mr. Windham urged, that the position of this vast country gives France access to the wealth of Mexico on one side, and a commanding influence over the United States on the other; that the cession of this and of part of Guiana, by giving her the command of the Amazons and the Mississippi, lets her into the hearts of North and South America, and is an eventual surrender of two continents to her. To this it was answered, that, Tobago excepted, France possessed all the West-India islands she now does in 1763, and yet that she was allowed to retain Louisiana; that its situation with regard to the Americans would excite jealousy on their part, and make them incline the balance of their politics in favour of Britain; that the mouth of the Mississippi is not a formidable naval station according to good professional authority; that this colony has never been of importance, and that it could not become so until France had first become a great naval power. This, Sir, is the best answer we have had yet to any of the objections urged against the treaty. But we must remember, that the last observation, all circumstances considered, is not very consoling, for though this country was not important *formerly*, and though it will require naval power to enable France to make it formidable, yet we must look to the map of Europe, observe the vast accession of sea coast to the French empire, the acquisition of the *industry* and *capital* of the Netherlands, and the controul over the naval and commercial resources of the Dutch; and perhaps we should not think the period of French naval greatness so remote, unless retarded by the military ambition of the French monarch, Buonaparté. In this, however, there is great hope; but it is a hope that the ministry affect by no means to entertain.

The effects, however, of this acquisition will be better seen when we look to what was urged by Mr. Windham against the vast cessions made to France in the West-Indies, cessions which she receives *improved* by our industry and capital. But by peace the dangerous sovereignty of Toussaint in St. Domingo will probably be destroyed. This Mr. Windham observed very justly was a reason for the West-India merchants, but not a satisfactory one for the British senate; for that the dominion of the French in that island, and in the others restored, was more dangerous to this country than Toussaint's power; but that to the West-India merchants Toussaint's success would be more injurious, because the foundation of his power would be the destruction of their property; whereas Buonaparté would found his greatness on the preservation of their property, upon the sole condition of their transferring their allegiance. The interests therefore of the planters is not a criterion of those of the nation, and the danger of Toussaint's government to the other islands, unpossessed as he is of any naval force, nothing to be compared to the vast power of the French Republic, to whom we thus surrender a port which almost commands our communication with our most important islands, and which in case of war would be from that cause a most formidable military position.

This reasoning is not answered by ministers. Lord Castlereagh, however, calculated, that St. Domingo could not be valuable for many years, for that supposing (which was the general opinion) that 300,000 negroes have fallen in the present troubles, to supply this number at the rate of £60 a man, would require £18,000,000, a capital France cannot afford. But we must remember what we before observed, that the European conquests of our rival, and particularly her sway in Holland, give her the command of a much greater capital than she formerly had; that this calculation depends entirely on the supposed fact of so many negroes being cut off, a fact the grounds of which his lordship does not tell us, and that at any rate Martinique, &c. are very valuable, and restored without an equivalent; that the French have a formidable force in the West-Indies, that they have a pretext to send still more ships and troops, and that St. Domingo is a commanding military station. Sir W. Grant, however, is of opinion, that the restoration of the French islands is advisable, because we had *too much*, and the possession of so many scattered islands divided our force. I do not find that the opposers of the peace answered this argument; probably it was not thought necessary.

In answer to this, however, may be urged what M. l'Abbé Du Bos observes, in his History of the League of Cambray, of the scattered possessions in Candia, Cyprus, Naples, &c. of the Venetians, that their

maritime greatness united all these separate parts, that by the facility of communication which their shipping afforded these possessions had all the advantages of contiguity without the disadvantages, for that the barbarous Turks not being a naval power could not overrun them, as they would, had they been on the Continent; and that this scattered situation was therefore their security. This is very applicable to our power in the West-Indies, whether we understand by the barbarous Turks, the negroes of Hispaniola, or Buonaparté and his Janizary legion of honour.

In the next place the Cape of Good Hope, it was objected by Lord Grenville, would not be virtually a free port. The stipulation that it should be so was totally nugatory, because no regulations were made, and we know that France would interpret its neutrality to admit as many ships of Holland, and of Spain, and of France, as of England, consequently, that the French interest would have three ships to our one. In war time we must have five times as many ships of war as the enemy to protect three homeward and two outward bound India fleets. And in respect of sending troops to India (a thing that would very probably be necessary from our neglect of our interests in that country) though single ships may run the passage without touching at the Cape, yet the troops on board would be unfit for service for months after their arrival; whereas by the possession of this settlement on the war with Tippoo breaking out in Asia, we were enabled, merely by sending orders to the Cape, to afford to the Indian army an immediate reinforcement of seasoned troops, which were present at the taking of Seringapatam. Considering the value and magnitude of our Indian empire, and its remote situation in another hemisphere, the link that secures the connexion unmolested between the two countries is of the utmost importance; yet this link, this key to our treasures in the East, is surrendered to our rivals in trade and in power under the feeble protection of a neutrality, which they may violate, and which we know admits of an interpretation equivalent to our exclusion. This important station my also, as we have learned in the instance of Louisiana, be surrendered to France. But what, Sir, is said to all this by the ministers and their friends. In the importance of this colony to our sheet anchor, our empire on the Ganges, and in the impolicy of surrendering it, Mr. Dundas concurred, and my Lord Hawkesbury stated himself satisfied with the provision made by the preliminaries. Mr. Dundas deserves to be congratulated on the consistency of his vote and his opinion; and my Lord Hawkesbury on his summary method of getting rid of an objection which he feels is unanswerable.

If we turn to Europe we find still further cessions It was observed before, that the definitive treaty differed from the preliminaries not in our favour, but to our further disadvantage, notwithstanding the accession of Buonaparté to the presidency of the Italian Republic, acquisitions of power which might, as Lord Pelham himself acknowledged, have justified ministers in breaking off the treaty, but which certainly, as Lord Grenville urged, entitled them to demand an equivalent cession to England in the definitive treaty. But, says Lord Hawkesbury, you have yielded the Netherlands, the left bank of the Rhine, &c. will you after so many cessions quarrel about Buonaparté's having the direct or indirect government of Italy? To this Mr. Thomas Grenville answered, that the number of cessions already made was the very reason why no more should be; and though Italy might not by itself be a sufficient ground for breaking off the treaty, yet superadded to Flanders, the Cape, &c &c. it might be. Sir William Grant admitted the justice of this reasoning, but yet denied the conclusion, and compared the breach of the negotiation, on account of the Italian Republic, after submitting to the French possession of the Netherlands, to the case of a man who should decline a law-suit for the removal of a nuisance at his own door, yet go the next day to a distant street and take upon himself the expenses of a law-suit for a nuisance, there the parties interested in it not choosing to bear any part of the expense. But, Sir, this is not a parallel case, for the French dominion over Italy, *superadded* to the loss of Belgium, amounts to more than that alone; whereas a nuisance at a distance will always be inferior to one near, whether that be put down or not. In a contention for power every further privilege, however small, is still an addition, and had he supposed the case of a Parliamentary contest, where the independent interest had lost the election for a knight of the shire through the corruption, violence, and low electioneering arts of the other party, but still contended for some of the boroughs in the county, it would have been a fair case. But this, Sir, would not have led to the conclusion Sir William

aimed at. The truth is, it is not the surrender of the Cape *alone*, nor of Italy *alone*, nor of the West-Indies *alone*, which is objected to; but *all these together*, on the principle my Lord Hawkesbury himself laid down in the outset of his speech, that the treaty should be considered as *a whole*.

In the next place with respect to Malta, it was argued: 1. That the order of Malta could not be independent, because by the confiscation of their property in France, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Spain, (in which latter country it either has taken place or is decreed to take place—Lord Grenville), they have but a revenue of £23,000 left to support an establishment which costs £130,000. In answer to this Lord Castlereagh stated, that two new langues or national classes have been established, a Russian and a Bavarian, which will make their revenue amount to £120,000 a year. This answer is to the point. And this point must rest on the authority of Lord Grenville and his brother on one side, and Lord Castlereagh on the other: 2. It was in the next place objected, that the institution of a Maltese *langue*, in which proofs of nobility were not requisite, instead of being a security of the independence of the order, was totally hostile to the spirit of the institution, and conformable only to French principles. To this Lord Hawkesbury answered, that the abolition of the langues of France prevented the influence of that country, and that the valour and attachment we had experienced in the natives of the island entitled them to our protection, and were pledges of their fidelity in future. But the Maltese are a pure democracy, and we all know how much the *people* are attached to those who *profess* the principles of France, and how little they are susceptible of gratitude. We know too, that the ancient knights from their constitution must be more attached to us, and that they are equally indebted for their restoration to our arms, as the Maltese are for their liberty: 3. The dissentions that would necessarily arise from such a combination of opposite principles, such an heterogeneous mixture of democracy and chivalry would, it was objected, render the interference of the guarantees of the treaty at least plausible if not necessary; that they were six powers of such opposite interests, that they probably would not agree, and that the vicinity of one of them, France, would enable her to seize the island, or in the language of Buonaparté to extend her protection over the order: 4. And what would still further assist the French to do this, it was urged, was the Neapolitan garrison; for as Naples must always lie at the mercy of her near and powerful neighbour, she dared not, could not attempt resistance to the consular orders; so that the surrender of Malta to Naples is in fact to give it up to France. To this Lord Hawkesbury's observation, that Naples would be faithful to preserve Malta, because the *independence* of Sicily would be lost with that of Malta, is no answer; because it *supposes* Naples independent and able to resist, when we all know it is not; and that a French force marched from the frontiers of the Italian Republic would extort from that feeble power the immediate surrender of this fortress; for the weakness of Naples would render nugatory the fortifications of Malta. It would therefore, as Mr. Windham observed, have been far preferable even *to have surrendered* Malta to France and obtained an equivalent elsewhere, than to have acted this farce, and thus again to have preferred punctilio to substance. It is virtually a surrender of a place of the first importance, which would have stopped the road of the French to Egypt, would have secured our Levant Trade (in which from our services to the Turks we have a right to expect great advantages), and in case of war, would have been, as Mr. Dundas said, a watch tower in the storm to direct the frighted nations of Italy to the haven of British protection.

Such are the vast sacrifices we make for peace notwithstanding the success of our arms, notwithstanding, as Lord Grenville urged, our formidable commanding position at the time of treating. The colonies we had conquered alone imported above two millions a year; the commerce of the world was in our hands; we had the most commanding military stations in every quarter of the globe—our enemy *was blocked up*; and our expense, though great, was supported by increase of trade, and *expended chiefly at home*, two circumstances that operated as a very material deduction from it.

Such were the resources the war supplied and the commanding influence it gave us. Look what is the peace! An *armed* peace. The sacrifice of our colonies, of our security for a *small* deduction of expense. We give up colonies that produce two millions to reduce our regular army 12,000 men out of 130,000, while in the West-Indies we are obliged to support a fleet of 35 sail.

Our commerce also, which is the very blood of our political body, will be reduced by the vast colonial establishments which

we restore to France and her allies, and by our not entering, as had been formerly our invariable custom, into a commercial treaty, by which we might have prevented that hostile system which France has adopted against our trade.

To these short but cogent objections I find my Lord Hawkesbury answer, as to a commercial treaty, that by the renewal of the old commercial treaties we should allow neutrals to carry enemies colonial produce, and be obliged to repeal the Alien Act. But, Sir, though it be very truly stated by his lordship, that political circumstances have changed, as in these two instances, so much as to prevent such a measure; yet a *new* commercial treaty was the first thing we should have stipulated for, since the prosperity of our trade is founded as much on our commercial treaties as on the navigation act.

His lordship also replies, that if France prohibits British imports it cannot succeed so well as in war time it did, and yet even then it was not successful. But we must recollect that the French were then *unable* to make imports to any amount *themselves*, consequently they were glad to smuggle them from the English. But now, though I hope and believe Buonaparté's prohibitions will not operate with the success he expects, yet as we have done all we could to help him in this plan by restoring to him and Holland the West-India islands so highly improved, their East-India possessions, and as the French and Dutch will no longer be impeded by war in the prosecution of commerce, we may reasonably expect not ruin to our trade (which Lord Hawkesbury is so earnest to disprove though it was never alledged), but a considerable diminution of it, and accession to that of France and her dependencies, a double loss by which what we lo e is not only to be deducted from ours, but added to our rival's prosperity. This might have been prevented by preserving our conquests to counterbalance the French acquisitions, and by insisting on a commercial treaty.

His lordship also urges, that the carrying trade will revert to us. But such has been the nature of this war, and such our superiority at sea, that we have had it in a great measure, and by the peace shall only find a new rival in the Dutch. He also urges the capital and enterprize of this country, and these certainly are the best antidotes to defeat the effect of his measures, but are not for that a justification of them. These are all we preserve, for our ministers could not lavish them away, though to do them justice, in Demerara they have contrived to part with some millions of capital. But still our trade, in consequence of no commercial treaty being concluded, stands on sufferance every where; and as France possesses or has influence over most of the great ports of Europe, we cannot long expect to be indulged.

Our inability to attack the French empire is another argument in support of our concessions. But is it necessary, because we cannot hurt France, to injure ourselves? But were the Mauritius inaccessible? Or might we not have continued a defensive war since there was so little more to conquer? As we have no expeditions to Holland or Egypt, might we not have reduced our vast army with as much security as at present, or kept up a force hardly more numerous? The peace is so expensive, that such a war would have been little more so, and we should have retained that wealth we have now thrown into the balance of our rivals. *If we take into the account the wealth we should have retained*, perhaps such a war would not have been more expensive than such a peace as this, certainly it would have been more advantageous.

But, Sir, the last excuse of ministers is the pacific disposition of Buonaparté.

The *conduct* however of ministers denies this. Even in debate they find it necessary at times to desert it. Even their own address betrays the insecurity of the peace. Nevertheless they urge to comfort us, that the spirit of Jacobinism is expiring in France. If by this, Sir, they mean that there is not a Republican government in France I agree with them. A military Turkish despotism has succeeded. But if they would say, that the spirit of ambition, of public robbery, or even the meaner arts of political swindling is no more in that country—I deny it, and I appeal to the history of the last seven months. Try the French by their own actions, and judge of their future pacific intentions, not from their conduct during the war, but since the signature of the preliminaries. Do they not already persecute our commerce? Have they not during the negotiations made further acquisitions by fraudulent means? Even, when they pay a debt they do it like a swindler, for they pay it with the property of others. In recompense to the King of Etruria for seizing Elba, they give him Piombino, belonging, as the treaty candidly states, to Naples. Pending the negotiations, has not Buonaparté, without communication

with us stepped into the throne of Italy? By another secret negotiation has he not acquired Louisiana? And all this too at the risk, if our ministers had had any spirit, of losing the vast advantages of the treaty, and of sacrificing his army in the West-Indies. Does he not also stipulate for the restoration of Cochin, a place only valuable to annoy us in India? And is he not that man who planned and commanded the expedition to Egypt? Artifices so gross, hostility so inveterate, and ambition so hot, cannot but be seen and dreaded by every body. Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh acknowledge the insecurity of the peace, and yet the former still justifies it, because if it last it will be good for the country he thinks, and this might be true, if we retained our conquests; but look at the vast price we pay for this *armed truce.*

The peace of Amiens is big with future war, and every friend to real peace must look at it with alarm. By the cessions it makes also how much must every considerate man dread this war, in which, as Lord Grenville observed, three successive brilliant campaigns would hardly bring us to that *point where we now are.* In this treaty we have so totally relinquished all attempts to preserve any balance against the French greatness, that no man dares look forward to the consequences. We look at the treaty and are astonished. As Lord Grenville urged, it has been concluded on two principles *directly opposite,* and on *each* in *opposition to our own interests.* France has been allowed to treat on the *uti possidetis,* while Great-Britain has been content to negotiate on the *statu quo ante bellum.* On either principle the balance of power might have been preserved.

Not a century ago, Sir, a woman with a hand *as firm* as the Romans of old, drew the line of demarkation, and told the Antiochus of France, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther."—From the inflammatory influence of the revolutionary mania, it is true we could not act thus; yet we might have preserved those conquests, which France was unable *even to reach,* as a counterbalance to her power in Europe. But, Sir, we have not acted thus. We have surrendered our own and confirmed the empire of the Consul. Buonaparté, alas!

> "Doth bestride this narrow world
> Like a Colossus; and we petty men
> Walk under his huge legs and peep about
> To find ourselves dishonorable graves."

But, Sir, let us hear the ministry. To the rehearsal of this long list of prodigal cessions, what do they oppose? They reply, we have Trinidad and Ceylon. These are possessions of great value without doubt, but my lord Hawkesbury was too prudent to state the case exactly in all its circumstances. He was a *better disputant* than to say, "We do make acquisitions to balance the power of France. We acquire Trinidad and Ceylon to weigh against the colonies we have restored. St. Domingo and the West-India islands, Pondicherry and the East-India settlements, Malta and the Cape, the gateway to the east, Trinidad and Ceylon too to counterbalance the new acquisitions of France, the river Amazons and the Mississippi, her indirect dominion over Spain and Holland, her union of the Netherlands and great part of Germany, her absolute despotism in Italy, her king-making in Etruria." His lordship was too prudent in his very eloquent and *argumentative* speech as it was called, ever to strike the balance between the French and English acquisitions confirmed by this treaty—a balance by which our future relative power is decided—a balance on which the merits of the treaty depend.

This *omission,* Sir, in a speech pronounced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs who concluded the treaty, applauded by the advocates for the treaty as eloquent and *argumentative*; and in the words of Mr. Pitt, as leaving nothing new to be urged in support of the measure, is, I think, to every impartial observer, as decided a condemnation of the peace as a vote of censure in both Houses could have been.—I will add *more* decided, because such a vote might be called in question for its motives; whereas this is self-conviction, is open confession from the first authority.

And with this, Sir, I will conclude my Review, apologizing for the unavoidable length into which I have been drawn by the multifarious nature of the subject and the important consequences we must look to.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient
humble Servant,
X.

CRITICAL NOTICE OF NEW BOOKS.

30. A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, *founded on the Treaties and Cus-*

toms of the modern Nations of Europe; to which is added, a complete List of all the Treaties, Conventions, and other Public Acts, from 1731 *to* 1788, *indicating the Works in which they are to be found. By* G. F. VON MARTENS, *Professor of Public Law in the University of Gottingen.—Translated, and the List of Treaties, &c. brought down to June,* 1802, *by* WILLIAM COBBETT.—The introduction to this work contains a definition of the Law of Nations, a history of that law and of its science, together with an account of the books necessary to its study. BOOK I. treats, 1. of Europe, as divided into states; 2. of these states according to their dignity, power, &c.; 3. of forms of government; 4. of the religion of European nations. BOOK II. of the basis of the positive law of nations, and 1. of treaties; 2. of tacit convention, custom, and analogy; 3. of prescription. BOOK III. of the internal constitution of a state, as far as it relates to foreign powers and their subjects; 1. of the rights of a nation with respect to its own territory; 2. of the rights and obligations of a nation with respect to its internal government and constitution; 3. of the different rights of sovereignty belonging to the internal government, and their effect on foreign powers and their subjects. BOOK IV. treats of transactions with foreign nations, and the rights relative thereto; 1. of the liberty and security of nations; 2. of the equality and dignity of nations; 3. of commerce; 4 of the rights of nations upon the seas. BOOK V. of the rights and customs which relate to the persons and families of sovereigns. BOOK VI. of the different instruments, and acts in writing, used in diplomatic affairs. BOOK VII. of embassies; 1. of the rights of embassy; 2. of the different orders of ministers; 3. of the formalities necessary to a minister's being received at a foreign court; 4. of ceremony with respect to ministers; 5. of the inviolability and independence of ministers; 6. of the rights of ministers in religious matters; 7. of immunities granted to ministers; 8. of the manner of conducting a negotiation; 9. of the retinue of a minister; 10. of the means of ending an embassy; 11. of the rights of ministers with respect to states to which they are not sent as ministers; 12. of secret embassies; 13. of state messengers. BOOK VIII. treats of the forcible means employed by a nation in the defence or the pursuit of its rights; 1. of retaliation and reprisals; 2. of the commencement of war; 3. of the manner of making war; 4. of conventions with the enemy; 5. of allies, subsidies, and auxiliaries; 6. of neutrality; 7. of making peace. BOOK IX. treats of the several means by which rights may cease.—Such being the contents of one volume in octavo, it is hardly necessary to observe, that the author has studied brevity; but he has, in no one point, neglected to refer, in the margin, to almost all, if not to all, those writers, and those public acts, that serve to illustrate his positions; and in this respect, the work is of very great utility.—The list of treaties, conventions, &c. &c. at the close of the volume, is, perhaps, as complete as any thing of the kind ever was. To those who have frequent occasion to refer to diplomatic instruments it will be found very convenient, more especially as we have not any work or works in our language, worthy of the name of a collection of treaties, a circumstance extremely disgraceful to the government and the country. We have nothing like a diplomatic code; nothing that can lead men to suppose that we understand this the most important of all earthly sciences. The truth is, the Parliament House swallows up all the talent and all the ambition of the brightest men in the kingdom; whence it is, that we are for ever outwitted, that we are for ever losing in the cabinet the advantage and the honour which we gain in the field.—As to the translation, it seems proper to observe, that it was originally done at Philadelphia, at the request, and, in some sort, at the expense, of the government. The President, the Vice President, and every member of the Congress had a copy of the work, which is now to be found in most of the law-libraries in the United States. In the revision, for which the present re-publication has furnished an opportunity, the translator has made some addition to the authorities referred to in the marginal notes, and has been particularly careful to notice all the tracts, to which the late dispute with the Northern Powers gave rise.

31. *Advice to a young Clergyman in the United Church of England and Ireland. By* JOHN NAPLETON, D. D. *Canon Residentiary of Hereford, Chancellor of the Diocese, Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Hereford.*—This excellent pamphlet is divided into seven chapters, the contents of the first of which only it falls within our plan to notice. This chapter is almost wholly taken up with observations on the duty of RESIDENCE, which is enforced by arguments so clear, so cogent, and so persuasive, that we cannot

help recommending a perusal of it to every clergyman in the kingdom. We know, what, indeed, is here acknowledged, that, in certain cases, it is impossible to yield implicit obedience to the laws of residence; but if the sentiments of this author were generally adopted by the clergy, we are sure that non-residence would be much less frequent than it is, that the schism-shops of the Puritans would gradually diminish, and that true religion and loyalty would greatly increase. Far be it from us to regard the church merely as an engine of the state; but experience, the surest of all guides, has taught us, that the church and monarchy of this country must stand or fall together; and, that the church cannot long stand without residence, and without residence, too, in a greater degree than at present prevails, we are fully convinced. When, from the top of any hill in this happy little island, we behold the numerous churches, which, by the wisdom, the liberality and piety of our forefathers, have been scattered around, we are naturally astonished, not that puritanism and its inseparable concomitant, disloyalty, should not be destroyed, but that it should ever, for a moment, have existed.

32. *Public Credit in Danger; or, Frauds on the Revenue, Private Wrongs, and Public Ruin. To which are added, Hints on the best Means to Provide for a Peace Establishment, without increasing the National Burthens. By a* MEMBER OF THE INNER TEMPLE.—The author of this pamphlet entertains some political opinions, to which we cannot subscribe; but, with his sentiments respecting the dilapidations on the revenue we most heartily concur. He has clearly made out his position, that frauds on the revenue become private wrongs, and, we think with him, that, unless they are put a stop to, or, at least, diminished, they must eventually produce public ruin. In his enumeration, however, of these wrongs, he appears to have confined himself to smugglers and the minor race of dilapidators, while the huge contractors and jobbers seem to have escaped his attention. He sees the little hillocks that lie scattered through the prospect, while the mountain, on the side of which he stands, is too big for his eye.—His "hints on the best means of providing "for a peace establishment" (which he justly observes should be large) "without "encreasing the national burthens," will not, we imagine, be of much use to the minister, to whom they are more particularly addressed. Mr. Addington's courage and firmness nobody will doubt, who looks at the terms of the peace or who recollects the modifications of the newly imposed taxes; but, though a bold man, we are fully persuaded, that he will think twice before he *taxes the funds*, a measure, however, which this adventurous blade of the Inner Temple scruples not to recommend, without recollecting, doubtless, that it would only be disguising the *sponge* under a different name.—"Such a *tax*" (for so he chooses to call it) "would have one ad-"vantage over all others; it would reach "*foreigners* as well as natives." But, without troubling ourselves with the logic, by which the *justice* of this is attempted to be maintained, we may safely aver, that, in one week, nay in one hour, after this "tax" should be proposed by the minister, there would be neither foreigner nor native to tax, unless it were the unfortunate few who should not be able to dispose of their stock.—Away with such "hints," which one certainly would not have expected from a writer, whose professed object it is to prevent "private wrongs."

33. *A short View of the Administrations of the Government of America, &c. &c. By* GEORGE ANDERSON, *Esq.*—The writer of this pamphlet discovers a mind accustomed to observation, and throws some light on a subject at all times interesting to the people of England; but his plan is too confined, and his materials appear to have been too scanty, to afford any thing like a satisfactory account of the measures and the motives of the rulers of the United States. With the commercial habits, views, and interests of the Union he appears to be tolerably conversant; but, as to the nature and effects of its political and judicial institutions, he conveys little information, and that little is not very correct.

34. *The Spirit of Anti-Jacobinism*, &c. &c. This is a duodecimo volume, consisting of essays in prose and verse, partly original and partly collected from the daily and other publications. These essays, some of which have very great merit, are, for the most part, of a political nature, and all have the recommendation of loyalty.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.

Nothing particular occurred in the House of Lords last week, until Wednesday (June 2). Some conversation, indeed, took place on Monday (May 31)

on some points in the Militia Regulation Bill, which terminated in two divisions. The one motion was to transfer the payment of some expenses from the treasurers of counties to the receivers of the land-tax; the other, that the time of exercising the men should be twenty-eight instead of twenty-one days. They were both negatived.

On Wednesday, the *Earl of Suffolk* gave notice that he should take the opportunity of the House being summoned on that day week to call their lordships' attention to two points of public importance—the poor's rate and the affairs of India. To the latter he should only advert generally, as a noble lord had given notice of a motion. The *Earl of Moira*, upon this, rose, and declared that his motion had only been deferred in expectation of some important information from India. Admitting to a certain degree the weight of the reason urged by the noble earl, the *Earl of Suffolk* pressed the period of the session, and the debts of India as loudly calling upon the House to turn its attention to that quarter. The situation of our affairs in India was such as might eventually affect England in the most injurious manner. *Lord Grenville* agreed with the noble lord on the magnitude of the object, but was decidedly against any discussion till the necessary and expected information arrived.—After some routine business had been gone through, *Lord Grenville* rose, and, apologizing for the irregularity of noticing what passed in the other House, adverted to the Clergy Non-residence Bill, to which he declared his wish of calling the attention of their lordships. That bill would come up to their lordships at a time when nearly the whole of the prelacy would be absent on indispensable duty, and in their absence it would be a manifest impropriety to discuss such a bill. It was, he believed, the wish of the respectable gentleman who brought forward the bill that it should have a full and deliberate discussion. For that purpose, it might, perhaps, be proper to let the bill lie over during the recess, that the public opinion might be better understood upon it. This proposition proceeded from no motive of hostility. In the late administration, a plan of a more broad and comprehensive principle had been in contemplation to regulate these matters. That plan not only regulated the affair of residence, but provided an adequate augmentation to the salaries of the lower orders of the clergy, which indeed were much in want of it, as not half the parochial clergy were in the enjoyment of more than £50 per annum, and the average income of the curates was only between £20 and £30 a year. He hoped the attention of the legislature would be turned to this question on broad and general grounds. Such a measure should have the support of government, and, to be effectual, should augment the income of the lower clergy.

The Report on the Militia Bill gave rise, the next day (Thursday, June 3), to a long conversation. The bill was objected to by *Lords Caernarvon*, *Romney* and *Fitzwilliam*, and defended by the *Lord Chancellor*, *Lord Pelham* and *Lord Hobart*. Some amendments were received, and the bill was ordered to be read a third time on Wednesday.

In the House of Commons, *Mr. Canning*, on Thursday (May 27), brought forward his motion relative to the cultivation of Trinidad. He concluded a speech, delivered with his accustomed facility and eloquence, by moving, "That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, humbly requesting, that, in order to prevent any importation of negroes into Trinidad, under colour or pretext of new grants, which might obstruct any future restrictions on such importation, His Majesty would be graciously pleased to direct that no new grants or sales be made without the express stipulation, confirmed by a bond, not to employ in their cultivation any negroes imported from Africa, until a report has been made to Parliament of the circumstances of the island, and Parliament shall have, in consequence, adopted certain regulations; and further, humbly requesting that His Majesty would be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before the House an account of all the sales and grants made in the mean time, and also a plan of such regulations as government may think proper to adopt for the cultivation of the Island of Trinidad, in the manner most likely to prevent the increase of the slave trade, and to promote the stability, integrity, and security of our colonial establishments."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, in reply, objected to partial discussions like the present, and declared, that, with respect to grants, none had been made, and that His Majesty's Ministers meant to advise that none should be made, until after the return of commissioners, who had been sent out to examine the island. After some conversation, the previous question was put and carried.

Nothing particular was done in the House on Friday (May 28).

On Monday (May 31), the Scotch Militia Bill was reported. On the motion that it be read a third time on Wednesday next, *Mr. Elliot* said, that partly in consequence of the multiplicity of business before the House, and partly owing to his own neglect of his parliamentary duty, for which he took much shame to himself, this bill had been upon the table for a considerable time without his knowledge, otherwise he should have troubled the House with a few words on it on the second reading, in preference to its present stage. A part of the bill, he thought, contributed to the improvement of the utility of the institution, to which it related, by extending the service of the Scotch militia to England; for he confessed, the establishment of a new force with the view of confining it in a remote quarter of the kingdom, had never appeared to him to be a measure reconcileable with any principle of public expediency. He perceived, however, a clause in the bill, which in case of imminent danger of invasion, or *other great emergency* (a pretty wide and general description), vested in His Majesty the power of increasing the Scotch militia in the proportion of one half. He assured the House, that it was not without much regret that he found himself in the predicament of appearing even to object to any arrangement connected with the defence and security of the kingdom, but he should really not act in conformity with the views he entertained of his own duty, if he permitted the bill, with the clause to which he had alluded, to pass totally without observation. He was not unapprized that the opinion he entertained, in respect to the general principle of adding to the number of the militia, would not be very popular either within or without those walls, and he was afraid that he had the misfortune to differ on this subject from some persons with whom he was much in the habit both of thinking and acting, and for whose judgment on all occasions he had the greatest deference and respect. Nevertheless, he could not persuade himself that the augmentation of the *local* force of the country was, in the present political circumstances of the world, a provident system of military policy. He was anxious to be correctly understood, and trusted it would not be imputed to him that he meant to speak with disparage-

ment of the militia service. No one held that service in higher estimation than he did, and no one could more cordially join in that tribute of applause and gratitude, which was due to the unexampled proofs of zeal, alacrity, and personal and private sacrifice for the public advantage, which that branch of the military establishment had exhibited in the course of the late war; and he could not help adding, because the circumstance had fallen within his own observation, that in those exertions, the right hon. gentleman who had brought in the bill, and the corps with which he was connected, had a distinguished and conspicuous share. But although he was among the persons who were most solicitous to preserve and cherish the institution, on the footing and on the establishment on which it lately stood, yet, looking to the general complexion of the affairs of Europe, the relative situation of this country, and its widely scattered possessions, he did feel the strongest conviction that it ought to be the careful policy of Great-Britain to reserve all the additional resources of her population for the provision of a formidable *disposable* force—a force which might be directed, as future exigences might require, either to the aggression of an enemy, or to the protection of the distant parts of the empire; and it was obvious, that, by the adoption of the system for augmenting the *local* force of the country, the means of recruiting the regular army would be very materially diminished. He knew that it was very currently argued, that the local force had, in the late war, proved the great recruiting fund of the army. The fact was indubitable, but he should refer to it as illustrating the proposition he was maintaining. At a period in the late war, there was a great deficiency of the regular army in comparison with the local force of the country. The ministers came to Parliament, and represented that the recruiting service was stagnant, not on account of any failure of population (for it was now clearly proved, by the documents on the table, that it had not diminished), but because a large proportion of the population was locked up in *defensive* corps. There was then a great force in the country, but it was suited only to a passive and inert system of defence. It was not applicable to an offensive enterprize; it could not be employed in one aggressive or active operation of hostility. We had a numerous garrison, but it was, by its very frame and constitution, deprived of the means of making a sally even for its own protection. What was the expedient resorted to in this embarrassment? The Militia Reduction Bill. The dissolution of a considerable proportion of the *local* force of the kingdom, for the supply of the regular army. A strong measure, but, in his opinion, fully justified by the emergency. From that measure, the country had derived the most solid and substantial benefits. To that measure was to be attributed one of the most splendid and valuable atchievements ever accomplished by the British army, to that measure we owed the rescue of Egypt from the hands of France, and the preservation of a large portion of the western continent of Asia. He wished to be considered as ascribing every merit that was due to the wisdom and energy of the councils which devised that arrangement, and to the patriotic zeal of those militia officers who facilitated its execution, but it mut be universally felt, that these experiments were not to be repeated. The right hon. gentleman disclaimed the measure as a *system*. It could not be adopted as such. The country gentlemen could not reasonably be expected to consent to the conversion of the regiments of militia into recruiting battalions for the line. It could not be resorted to as an established principle of policy, without risking the exclusion from the militia of that description of officers, which it was not only desirable to retain in it, but constituted the very vital principle and essence of the institution. However, whatever difference of sentiment might prevail, in regard to the exercise of the English militia, he had conceived there could have been no diversity of opinion in respect to the inexpediency of augmenting the Scotch. It must be well known to every gentleman in the House, that Scotland was, for its size, a singularly productive recruiting field of the British army. From that part of the United Kingdom were drawn many of the best, strongest, hardiest recruits. There was in the character of the nation a strong propensity to military habits; the people were well suited to bear the hardships of war; and, by the sobriety and regularity of their manners, they were peculiarly adapted for the constraint and subordination of military discipline. In the northern part of that country too, through the spirit of clanship, and the hereditaty attachment which prevailed there to particular families, there were means of recruiting which existed in no other parts of the Empire. The establishment, therefore, of a large local force within so contracted a space was, he maintained, to cut up by the roots the recruiting service of the army. It was absolutely to frustrate and nullify the military resources of the country. The attempt to combine a considerable augmentation of the local force with the recruitng service of the army was, he asserted, an incongruous system. It was to present inducements to men to stay at home, at the same time that invitations were held out to them for enlistment for general service. A premium was offered with one hand against the bounty which was tendered with the other. For these reasons, he had always thought the original institution of the Scotch militia an injudicious arrangement; and he was sure its augmentation would be a perseverance in a very injurious error. It might, perhaps, be said, that the number of men proposed to be added was not large. For the extent of the country, however, he alleged, it was not inconsiderable. It might probably be stated, that the measure was not to be carried into effect, unless in case of the danger of invasion, or some pressing emergency. To that he should answer, that it was not evident that it would be necessary even in the event of invasion, to increase the militia; for if a considerable portion of transferable force was in the kingdom in such an exigency, it would be as applicable for the purpose of defence as a local force. But if such a measure should prove requisite, the intervention of Parliament might then be used; and if it was not sitting, it could be convened soon enough to give its sanction to the measure. The bill, however, did not limit the measure to the event of invasion, but extended it to *any other great emergency*, which words vested in the government a complete discretion on the subject. A *great emergency* might, for instance, be the commencement of a war, the very conjuncture at which he should most deprecate such a measure. In short, he desired to be understood as objecting to the *principle* of the arrangement, since it led to a system, which was fundamentally vicious, and which appeared to him to be directly the reverse of that which in the event of a war, it would be expedient for this country to adopt. As there was other business of moment awaiting the attention of the House, he should not trouble it further on the subject, though he should otherwise have been disposed

to have gone into it more at length, as it was a topick on which he had always felt much interest and solicitude.

Mr. Windham concurring in opinion with his hon. friend, declared that he thought he had not gone far enough. He himself, disapproved entirely of the defensive system; and, though he did not wish to see the militia extinguished, thought it ought to be reduced far below even the old establishment. By the militia system, the bounty given for recruits had been raised from one guinea to fifteen. He considered a regular army as the proper and the best defence of the country. The *Secretary at War* made some remarks in reply. The bill was then ordered, to be read a third time on Wednesday. The order of the day being read, for taking into consideration the Report on the Clergy Residence Bill, *Mr. Simeon* rose to oppose the *Speaker* leaving the chair. He was supported in his opposition by *Mr. M. A. Taylor*. It was said, that the present bill not only destroyed all former statutes, but changed the constitution of the church, by lodging an enormous power in the hands of the bishops; that as to the rigour of the statute of Henry VIII. it had, by the lapse of time been completely done away; that this bill would subject the inferior clergy to something very like slavery; that to give a greater degree of latitude in farming to clergymen, secularized their character, and altered their situation in society; that the clause, allowing non-residence, could be no effectual relief to the distresses of the poorer clergy; that their salaries ought rather to be increased; that it was more proper to give the judgment as to residence into the hands of a jury than a bishop; and that the present bill, though said to be a *bonus* to the clergy, was, in reality, unpopular among that body. To this, it was replied by the *Chancellor of the Exchequer* and the *Master of the Rolls*, that a great part of the reasoning used against the bill was inapplicable to the motion; that the present bill was introduced, not because non-residence had increased, but because informers had shewn a disposition to enforce the statute of Henry VIII.; that the conduct of the clergy had been of such an exemplary nature as to call for particular favour; that the statute was particularly oppressive to the inferior clergy; that the present bill ought not to be objected to because it did not go far enough, because it made no pecuniary provision for the clergy; that it was far better to submit the clergy to the discretion of their bishops, than to that of an informer; that it was unjust that the one minister should be subject to the temporal courts for not sleeping in a parsonage-house; and should suffer ruinous penalties, while another, who merely complied with the statute, but was of a bad moral character, was left untouched by them; that it was degrading the character of a clergyman to sue him in a court of law for penalties; and that the object of this bill, was only to try if the discipline of the church could be carried on by means of the constitutions of the church. It was, therefore, urged that the bill ought to go into a committee. The *Attorney-General*, though agreeing in many points with the opposers of the bill, declared that he could not concur in their vote, as many of the objections started by them might be removed in a committee. He would, therefore, vote for the bill going into the committee, though he disapproved of many of its parts. *Mr. Windham* spoke strongly in favour of the bill; the only objection to which was, in his mind, that it did not wholly repeal the statute of Henry VIII. The present bill, he thought, placed the power of the church in those hands where it ought to be placed. The discretionary power to be exercised by the superior over the inferior clergy, was of the least objectionable kind; it was in the nature of that possessed by a parent over his child. It was a policy wise in itself and moderate in its principles, that the church should not be under the necessity of recurring to civil tribunals for the determination or preservation of its discipline. It was also desirable, that the church should not be made that species of democratic body, which a repeated reference to courts of law, to enforce rights without rank, necessarily tended to create. The question was now called for, and strangers withdrew, but no division took place. The bill then went into a committee of the whole House, in which several clauses were agreed to, after much discussion; but many provisions of the bill remaining to be considered, the chairman reported progress, and asked leave to sit again, and the House adjourned.

On Wednesday (June 2), the House being resolved into a committee of supply, *Admiral Berkeley* called the attention of the committee to the report on Dr. Jenner's petition, and concluded by moving that the sum of £10,000 should be granted to Dr. Jenner, for his discovery of vaccine inoculation. After considerable debate, in which it was proposed by *Sir H. Mildmay* to vote the sum of £20,000, the original sum was put, and carried.—The sum of £1,200 was also granted to Mr. Greathead, for his discovery of a life-boat.—In a committee it was resolved, that the rate of postage from France should be the same as to that country (10d.); that the postage to and from Holland should be equalized (12d.); that there should be four post-days instead of two; and that the tonnage-duty should be taken off the packets going between Dover and Calais.

On Thursday (June 3), *Mr. Corry* moved in a committee of the House, for leave to bring in a bill to relieve the Irish retailers from the duty of 5 per cent. After some opposition from *Mr. Beresford* and *Mr. Foster*, which occasioned a division, leave was granted. *General Gascoyne* having, on account of the lateness of the session, withdrawn his motion on the slave-trade, the House resolved itself into a committee on the sinking fund. The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* having moved to fill up the blanks, *Mr. Bankes* rose to express his disapprobation of the measure before the House. No advantage would, he said, arise from the plan, except the 1 per cent. on the last loan, but its disadvantages were greater than the public imagined. Till 1808, the two plans bore no comparison in point of advantage. Taking stocks at par, no advantage would be derived from this plan in less than 38 years. It was of consequence to alleviate taxes, though in ever so small a degree. By the old plan, this alleviation would have commenced six years hence. Such an immediate operation was felt and acknowledged, but people were little affected by calculations of distant advantages, which they did not understand. The measure was also opposed by *Mr. Tierney*, who contended that by the present plan, the public faith was broken, the immediate consequences of which would be distrust in monied men, and disadvantageous terms on future loans. *Mr. Thornton* also objected to the measure before the House, on the ground that it only postponed our difficulties, and postponed them to the probable period of another war. The plan was defended by the *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, *Mr. Boyd*, and *Mr. N. Vansittart*. It was contended in its favour, that by the adoption of it, the public was spared the burthen of taxes to the amount of £900,000, which must otherwise have been imposed. This was an immediate advantage. Its remote ones were of great consideration. By this new plan, the whole

of the national debt would be redeemed in four years less than by the old. In the year 1808, there would be a relief of £512,000, and in that year or the next a further relief of £1,500,000, by paying off the 4 and 5 per cents. By the old plan, a relief of only £120,000 would be obtained at the same period. That the monied interest were not adverse to the present measure, was obvious from the terms of the last loan, which were the most advantageous that had ever been procured.—After some explanations from *Mr. Bankes* and *Mr. Tierney*, the resolutions were agreed to, and the report was ordered to be received on Wednesday.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

St. Domingo, March 30.—News, of this date, received through the American papers, represent the difficulties of the French as increasing; but, the relations of the different American captains, who are all enraged at the conduct of Leclerc, disagree materially, and seem to contain but one fact, which rests on any solid foundation, viz. that RIGAUD, the former rival of TOUSSAINT, who, with the remnant of his army, had been brought from Cuba, had, in consequence of his beginning to correspond with one of the black generals, been sent on board the fleet by Leclerc, with an order to send him to France by the first opportunity. The black to whom he had written was, indeed, one of those who had come over to Leclerc, nor does the letter (which is published) contain a single sentiment hostile to the cause of France; but Leclerc seems very properly resolved not to suffer these sable auxiliaries to assume any consequence in the colony.—The American papers contain horrid accounts of the cruelties committed by Toussaint and his followers. They may be exaggerated; but the reality can in no respect surpass what was committed by the same ferocious wretches in the years 1792, 1793, and 1794, when they literally drank the blood and ate the flesh of several white women and children in the northern and middle part of St. Domingo.

Barbadoes, April. 24.—Under this date there is a letter from Dominica, dated April 14, giving an account of the revolt of the Negro Corps, in the latter island, in substance as follows:

On the 9th, the 8th West-India regiment, composed of blacks, mutinied, and in a most barbarous manner put to death captain Cameron, lieutenant Mackay, lieutenant Wastnays, commissary Laing, and quarter and barrack-master-serjeant M'Kay. Clerk of the cheque Barron, and quarter-master-serjeant Young, were both wounded, the former dangerously. His excellency the Hon. A. Cochrane Johnstone, who is colonel of the 8th West-India regiment, and governor of the Island of *Dominica*, immediately collected all the troops, militia, and other European force he could muster, and embarked for Prince Rupert's, where the black regiment was stationed, and where they had committed the atrocities above recited. Fortunately some ships of war were in the Bay, the marines of which were landed, and assisted in the reduction of the mutineers. The governor found them drawn up in their usual place of parade, with two of their officers, whom they had spared, in their front. They refused to obey the governor's order to ground their arms, and were immediately fired upon with such effect, that those who did not fall, attempted to save themselves by flying to the hills. The excellent disposition, however, made by the governor of his force, frustrated their designs, and the whole were exterminated, excepting about 130, who were secured and sent as prisoners on board the ships of war.—The people of *Dominica* were at a loss to account for the commission of so horrid an outrage. We can suppose it might have originated in the apprehension of being disarmed, disbanded, and returned to a state of labour.

Genoa, May, 22.—On the 19th in the morning 550 French Troops of the 3d light demi-brigade, embarked from hence on board three Polacres, escorted by the Aviso, which arrived here some days since. The Captains are ordered to proceed to Cape Spartel, where they are to open the sealed orders they have received, and learn their ulterior destination.

Paris, May 31.—M. Coquebert Montbert is appointed Consul for England; that is, Commercial Agent.

From the tenor of the several communications made by Chaptal, the minister, it is evident, that great alarm and some discontent prevail in France, on account of the scarcity of bread-corn, and the high price of bread, which is one-fourth dearer than in England.

Ghalib Effendi, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary from the Sublime Porte, arrived in Paris the day before yesterday, at five in the evening.

The Paris papers contain, under this date, a note from the Minister of Police, assuring the public, that all the reports about plots against the life of the First Consul are totally void of foundation.

The following epigram, by Le Brun, the poet, on Carnot's vote, has been the subject of much amusement in Paris. It alludes to Carnot having been of Robespierre's committee during the reign of terror:

Vous dites oui, moi, je dis non,
Messieurs je ne suis pas des vôtres,
Je signe ma proscription;
J'avais ma foi signé bien d'autres.

The following articles, which are translated from the MONITEUR, *are worth attention, as they tend to throw much light on the views of Buonaparté and his agents with respect to political parties in this country.*

June 1.—"The English Journals of the 28th of May have come to hand. They are full of tragical events. According to them, General Berthier has been killed in a duel, an aid-de-camp of the Chief Consul has been killed on the parade, and the Chief Consul has been dangerously wounded. In a word, they talk of nothing but assassinations and divisions among the principal citizens of the Republic. Letters have been distributed by two row-boats all over Morbihan, written by the *ci-devant* bishops of St. Paul de Leon and Noyon against the Concordat, the Republic, and the Pope. The *ci-devant* archbishop of Montpelier is now printing a long letter to the Pope to prove that he is justified in preferring to his apostolical career a comfortable retirement in England, and the quiet enjoyment of the fortune conferred upon him by his nephew, whom he had twenty-five years ago the good sense to make an apostate from the Catholic religion, to qualify him for the succession to estates and dignities in Ireland. Other small vessels have inundated Britanny with a great variety of placards in the jacobin style. The most moderate epithet they apply to the Chief Consul is that of *poisoner*. These hand bills have been sent to many individuals in St. Maloes, Dinan, and St. Servan. At a dinner to which citizen Otto was invited, and at which the heir apparent of the English monarchy was present, the sons of the prince Egalité were among the guests, and wore the stars, crosses, and insignia of the Bourbons.—A conduct so contrary to the conditions of peace, to the daily declarations of ministers, to the decorum which every government ought to observe, can only be explained by the existence of parties and factions who labour in a contrary direction.—Let the speech of citizen Gallois be compared with those of Mr. Windham and lord Grenville; let the circumspect and measured language of all the French writers be compared with the furious, disgusting, and malignant tone assumed by the greatest number of the English journals, and it will be seen that while the former express the sentiments of a people who love and cherish peace, and who are anxious to second the intentions of their government, the latter abet a party hostile to the peace of the world, and to every benevolent, charitable, and generous feeling.

June 3.—Under this date, and under the head of "DEBATES IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT," we find the Moniteur, after throwing the blame of a continuation of the war on Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, making the following remarks:

"In a word, it was not till after the treaty of Luneville, and until the new ministers had taken the helm of the state, that England opened serious negotiations; there was then an end of the business of interfering with the affairs of the continent. The peace of the continent was made without their concurrence. The ill temper and hostile sentiments *(la roideur et la malveillance)* of Lord Grenville, had rejected every opportunity of contributing to that object, and dissipated every chance of renewing the coalition against France. In these circumstances what could the English nation expect from the new ministry? That they should preserve for their country in India the inestimable one of Ceylon, which cannot be reckoned too high. In the West-Indies, the most important and well situated of the islands they had conquered.

"It is possible for us to refute sentence for sentence the whole speech of Lord Grenville. It is not necessary to show that *he* is alone responsible for whatever he objects against the *ancient* ministers. If Italy is under the influence of France, *he* alone is to blame? If Naples has recovered its political independence, it is due to the ability of his successor. If Hanover was taken possession of by the King of Prussia, and on the point of being occupied by France, it was the fault of the old ministry. If the King of England has recovered his electorate, it is owing to the prudence and wisdom of his new ministers. If Portugal saw her frontiers overrun, and in danger of being blotted out of the list of European powers, it was the fault of the old ministry. If she has been saved and lost nothing in Europe, it is to the prudence of the new ministry that she is indebted for the obligation.

"Although England may have brave sailors, like those whom she undoubtedly possesses; admirals like Lord St. Vincent's, worthy to command them; officers intelligent and active, like Sir Sydney Smith; negotiators candid (*loyaux*,) firm, conciliating, like Lord Cornwallis and Lord St. Helens; able financiers, like Mr. Pitt.....All these distinguished men, however, would be unable to maintain her in the rank she is destined to occupy, if at the head of her cabinet she had hot-headed men (*des hommes passionnés*) like Lord Grenville, or ministers like Mr. Windham, whose violence would lead to the same consequences as incapacity."

DOMESTIC OCCURRENCES.

On Tuesday, June 1, being the day appointed for the general thanksgiving, the House of Lords attended at Westminster Abbey, when a sermon was preached by the Bishop of Chichester from the 22d chapter of the First Book of Chronicles, the 18th and 19th verses.

There were present the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Rochester, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellenborough, Lord Alvanley, and a number of other Peers.

The House of Commons attended at St. Margaret's Church, where a sermon was preached by Dr. Vincent, from the 58th Psalm, and 10th verse. The Speaker took possession of a new pew, constructed in the Gothic style in the gallery under the organ on the rebuilding of the church.

The Members present were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Richard Hill, Sir Charles Morgan, Sir Edward Knatchbull, Sir William Dolben, Colonel Phipps, and Messrs. Martin, Bond, Lefevre, Steele, and about *twenty* other members.

On Wednesday the 2d of June the Count de Lally Tolendal had the honour to kiss the hand of his Majesty, and to take leave on going abroad.

Sir Alexander Ball has departed for Malta, where he is to reside as Minister Plenipotentiary from his Majesty.

Robert Liston, Esq. late minister in America, is to go, in that capacity, to the Hague.

Mr. Merry, who is now at Paris, is intended to supply the place of Mr. Liston in America, after his return from Spain, whither he is about to proceed in the hope of being able to accomplish some sort of a commercial arrangement with the Court of Madrid.

On the 2d inst. the ceremony triennial montem took place at Salt Hill, and was honoured with the presence of their Majesties, four of the Princesses, and the Duke of Cumberland.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge arrived at Ritzebuttel on the 30th of May, and set off in the afternoon of the same day for Hanover.

The subscribers to Mr. Pitt's statue have (by public advertisement) rescinded the former resolution, that the money should accumulate till Mr. Pitt's death. The subscription is to be kept open long enough to give "every individual in the British Empire an opportunity of subscribing." A meeting is to be held in May, 1803, to nominate a committee to carry into effect the object of the subscription.

General Andreossi is mentioned as the Ambassador to the Court of London.

A most shocking affair has happened at Aberdeen. Some of the Officers of the regiment lying there having been insulted, as they assert, by the populace, on the night of the King's Birth Day, called out their men, and, as it is stated, ordered them to fire on the people, several of whom were killed. Some of the officers are in prison, and others are said to have escaped.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

The Clergy Non-residence Bill has, upon the motion of the right hon. framer, been postponed 'till next session. Our subsequent Parliamentary Report, will contain the reasons at length, which induced Sir William Scott to make this motion; but, in the mean time, every one must perceive the impropriety of passing a bill of this nature with the House so very thin as it is at present. Indeed, the question respecting the Peace Establishment has been decided with benches almost bare; and, though Sir Henry Mildmay's Black Game Bill is of less importance, we have no scruple in expressing our wish, that it may be postponed 'till next session. Whether the game laws are not already sufficiently numerous, complicated and severe, may be a question admitting of some doubt. It may, when the subject is well examined, be found proper to make some regulation "for the better preservation of the Heath Fowl, in the New Forest." We, for our parts, are the very last persons in the world to wish to see the rights and privileges of the nobility and gentry encroached upon by their inferiors; but, we cannot see, with satisfaction, the great increase of penal laws; such laws never should be passed without due deliberation, and, if possible, without being amply discussed. The multiplicity of penal laws tends to weaken, and not to strengthen, the authority of government; because they are but too often liable, in inferior hands, to become a source of that vexation and oppression, which necessarily alienate the affections of the people.

The funds still continue in a state of depression; but we do not therein perceive any danger to the credit of the country. The loan may probably take away a few of those millions, which the lenders have heretofore gained, and in this we see nothing to lament. "We squeeze you, sponge, and you are dry again."

Bread will rise next week, and will, probably, get up to a shilling the quartern loaf, before harvest. This, however, is a symptom by no means alarming. Wages are already high enough to meet a considerable rise in the price of provisions; and, as to scarcity, thank God, there is no fear of it in this country, while, in France, it presents an aspect, which evidently terrifies the all-powerful Corsican. Bread is there at six sous a pound, which, in proportion to the price of labour, is four times as dear as it is in England. The ensuing crop is said to promise uncommon abundance; but it is yet too early to ascertain that point, with any degree of precision. Misery is said to abound to an extent unparalleled, and, we know by experience, that scarcity is less fearful from the real sufferings that it causes, than from the pretext with which it furnishes the idle and the disaffected. Importations will not flow into France as they did into England, and, should the next crop fail, let Buonaparté look to himself. The present price of bread in France settles the dispute with respect to the effect which *war* has on the price of bread-corn. "*Peace* and *plenty*" was the cry at Paris as well as London, and

we now see what sort of plenty peace has brought in both places. With us nothing has fallen in price but bread, which fall is to be entirely attributed to the fine harvest and the abundant crop, and, in no degree whatever, to the peace.

By a reference to our Foreign Intelligence, it will be perceived. that the MONITEUR has been instructed to lend a helping hand to defend his Majesty's ministers against the dreadful "*conspiracy*" which Mr. Dundas stated to be formed against them. We lament that Mr. Pitt should have furnished a ground for those infamous commendations, which the French official paper has so liberally conferred on Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, and, we believe, every honest and honourable man in the nation, would gladly share in the abuse bestowed on Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham. The offence which these great and upright statesmen have committed against France, is, their having roused Englishmen to a sense of their danger; having put them upon their guard; having compelled the ministers themselves to promise by a vote of Parliament, that they "will defend, *against every encroachment*, "the great sources of wealth, commerce, "and naval power of the empire." This resolution was to be attributed solely to the opposers of the peace, and it constitutes an offence, which the ambitious foe will never forgive.

The news from Dominica is of a most melancholy nature. A letter from ROSEAU, printed in the Barbadoes papers, states, that the black corps had revolted, and killed their officers, but that tranquillity had been restored. It is hardly fair for those, who have silently seen the establishment of the black corps, now to find fault with that establishment; but, for us, who have uniformly insisted, that negroes never ought to have been thus put upon a level with white men, even as musicians or drummers, we may with great propriety, cite the events in Dominica in confirmation of our opinion. The introduction of negroes into the army, the clothing of them in regimentals, necessarily degrades the profession of the soldier; it sinks him in the eyes of the world, and, which is much worse, in his own estimation. We hope that those corps will be disbanded with all convenient speed, and that the peace and security of our colonies will be committed exclusively to the arms of Britons.

Other details, besides those to be found in the papers from Barbadoes, have reached London—from which it appears, that the revolted Blacks acted with the most horrid brutality towards the *wives* and *daughters* of their officers, most of whom actually expired upon the spot, under the violence of these loathsome and savage monsters! And, are we to be called upon to grant money, are our countrymen to be sent to Sierra Leone, to cultivate the acquaintance of this black, and brutal, and bloody race? Is it for the benefit of wretches like these, that an *academy* is to be supported at Clapham? Are they to officiate in our churches, and marry our daughters? It is time the nation should be roused from its philanthropic dream; that it should see this matter in the true light; and that some means should be taken to put a stop to the increase of Blacks in this country, at any rate, where they have made no little progress in changing the colour of the inhabitants. It is truly shocking to see the number of English women, who are married to Negroes: our streets and public walks are continually disgraced by the disgusting spectacle; and who are we to blame but ourselves for foolishly yielding to the importunities of those who have the address to make us pay for the *genteel* education of these sable intruders?

By advices just received from Sierra Leone, it appears that the philanthropic colony had been again attacked by the natives, on the 11th of April last. More fighting! more bloodshed! Where and when will this Negromania end? More Africans have been killed, absolutely put to death by the halter and the sword, in this humanity colony, every year since its establishment, than in all the West-Indies put together, previous to the year 1786, that is, previous to the clamours about the slave trade.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

MISSOGALLI's *Letter shall be attended to.*—*We thank X. most sincerely, and request a continuation of his favours.*—CLERICUS *will find, in Sir Wm. Scott's speech, all the information he seems to stand in need of.*—*The subject of the East-India Company's dispute with Mr. Dundas shall be resumed in our next.*

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.

Whitehall, March 20, 1802.

The King has been pleased to give and grant unto the Right Honourable Horatio Viscount and Baron Nelson of the Nile, and of Burnham Thorpe, in the County of Norfolk, Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and Vice-Admiral of the Blue Squadron of His Majesty's Fleet, (also Duke of Bronte, in Sicily, and Grand Cross of the Order of St. Ferdinand and of Merit,) his Royal Licence and

Permission to receive and wear the Insignia of the Order of the Crescent, which the Grand Signior hath transmitted to him: and also to command, that this his Majesty's Concession and Declaration, together with the relative Documents, be registered in his College of Arms.

Whitehall, June 5, 1802.

The King has been pleased to give and grant unto Major-General Sir Eyre Coote, Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, his Royal License and Permission to receive and wear the Insignia of the Order of the Crescent, which the Grand Signior hath transmitted to him: and also to command, that this his Majesty's Concession and Declaration, together with the relative Documents, be registered in his College of Arms.

Downing-Street, June 5, 1802.

His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Lieutenant-General William Grinfield to be Commander of all his Majesty's Land Forces serving in the Leeward and Windward Charibbee Islands, and in the Island of Trinidad.

Whitehall, June 5, 1802.

The King has been pleased to order a Congé d'Elire to pass the Great Seal, empowering the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Gloucester to elect a Bishop to that see, void by the translation of the Right Reverend Father in God Doctor Richard Beadon, late Bishop thereof, to the See of Bath and Wells; and his Majesty has also been pleased to recommend George Isaac Huntingford, Doctor in Divinity, to be Bishop of that See.

The King has been pleased to grant to the Reverend William Busby, Clerk, Master of Arts, the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of his Majesty's Metropolitical Church of Canterbury, void by the death of Doctor Heneage Dering, late one of the Prebendaries thereof.

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

Births.—Wednesday morning, at half past six o'clock, her Grace the Dutchess of Dorset, of a son, at Dorset House, Whitehall. On Saturday morning, in Grafton Street, the Right Hon. Lady Charlotte Duncombe, of a daughter. In Gloucester-place, Portman-square, the Lady of Sir Grenville Temple, Bart. of a daughter. On Saturday evening, in Park-place, the Right Hon Lady Caroline Stuart Wortley, of a son. On the 2d inst. at Hampton-Court Palace, Lady Ann Culling Smith, of a son. On Friday last, the Right Hon. the Countess of Cassillis, at his Lordship's house, in Cavendish-square, of a son.

Marriages.—On Thursday, at St. James's Church, Colonel Bayley Wallis, M. P. for Ilchester, to Mrs. Bosville, widow of the late Colonel Bosville, of the Guards.

Deaths.—On Wednesday night, in Berkeley-square, Mrs. Jane Mainwaring, a maiden Lady, sister of William Mainwaring, Esq. M. P. The Bishop of St. Asaph, on the 4th inst. at his house in Oxford-street. Sunday the 23d ult. at St Omer's, on his road to Paris, the Right Rev. Gregory Stapleton, Catholic Bishop of the Middle District, and brother to T. Stapleton, Esq. of Carlton, Yorkshire. At Berhampore in India, Maj. General Robert Rawstorne. The 26th ult. at his house on Croom's Hill, Greenwich, Christopher Mason, Esq. Vice-Admiral of the White, in the 58th year of his age. Friday last, at his seat at Fulbeck, in Lincolnshire, the Hon Henry Fane, M. P. for Lime Regis, in Dorsetshire, brother to the late, and uncle to the present Earl of Westmoreland.

PRICES OF THE PUBLIC FUNDS.

	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THU.	FRI.
Bank Stock	—	—	—	—	181	—
3 per Cent Red. Ann.	71⅜	—	—	71¼	71⅜	—
3 per Cent Consols..	—	—	—	—	—	—
4 per Cent Consols..	85⅜	—	—	86¼	86½	—
5 per Cent Ann.....	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bank Long Ann.....	20⅛	—	—	20½	20⅝	—
D° Short 1778 &1779	5	—	—	5	5	—
Imp. 3 per Cent.....	—	—	—	70⅛	71	—
D° Ann.....	11¾	—	—	—	12	—
3 per Cent 1797....	102⅛	—	—	102¼	102⅜	—
Omnium.....	2½	—	—	1½	1	—
India Stock.....	—	—	—	—	111	—
D° Bonds.....	—	—	—	—	—	—
South-Sea Stock....	—	—	—	—	—	—
D° Old Ann.....	—	—	—	—	—	—
D° New.....	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 per Cent. 1751....	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Navy Bills....	—	—	—	—	—	—
Exchequer d°	—	—	—	—	—	—
Irish 5 per Cent....	—	—	—	—	—	—
Irish Debentures....	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lottery Tickets....	—	—	—	—	—	—

AMERICAN STOCKS.—Eight pr. c. 111¼.

FRENCH STOCKS.—Tiers Consolidé, 55 f. 60 c.

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C.F.	10 16	us.	LEGHORN 51¼
D°, at sight	10 12		NAPLES..... 44
ROTTERDAM..	10 17	us.	GENOA 47
HAMBURGH..	33 1	2½us.	VENICE, 59¼ livres piccole
ALTONA	33 2	2½us.	effective per £. ster.
PARIS 1 day	23 13		LISBON..... 67½
BOURDEAUX,	23 19		OPORTO 67
CADIZ	34	in paper	DUBLIN..... 12
DITTO	35¾	effective	BILBOA..... 36 D°
MADRID ..	34	in paper	PALERMO ....
DITTO	36½	effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

	s.	s.		s.	s.
Eng. Wheat per q.	64	to 76	Hops per cwt...	80	to 140
Foreign.....	54	.. 70	Hay per load	80	.. 95
Rye.....	80	.. 34	Beef, per stone....	4s. 0d.	
Barley.....	30	.. 84		to 5s. 0d.	
Malt.....	44	.. 51	Mutton	5s. 6d.	to 6s.
Oats	14	.. 25	Veal	4s. 0d.	to 5s. 6d.
Pease (white)....	35	.. 39	Pork....	4s. 6d.	to 5s. 4d.
Beans (horse)....	31	.. 33	Tallow	3s. 9d.	
Flour per sack ..	55	.. 60	Average of Sugar		
Seconds.....	45	.. 50	per cwt.	34s. 1½d.	
Coals per chal....	38	.. 43	Salt, per Bushel..	14s.	

Bread *Ten Pence* the Quartern Loaf.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE WEATHER, *near Guildford, in Surrey, for the Month of June,* 1802.

Days.	M's Age	Weather.	Winds. M.	Winds. A.	Barometer. Inches. M.	Barometer. Inches. A.	Thermometer. Degrees. M.	Thermometer. Degrees. A.
3		Fine-Th.	S	S	29,7	29,63	65	72,5
4		Fair.	SW	SW	29,56	29,54	67	67
5		Fine.	SW	SW	29,47	29,46	66	65
6		Showery.	SW	SW	29,6	29,6	60	62,5
7		Rain.	NW	NW	29,58	29,59	55	57,5
8	☾	Fair.	NW	W	29,58	29,54	61	62
9		Rain.	SW	SW	29,57	29,58	58	60

● *New Moon* ☾ *1st. Quar.* ○ *F. Moon.* ☽ *last Quar.*

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